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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                     
No. 05-2348
                      
JANTJE TIMBULENG,
                                            Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                  Respondent
                                       
Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A95-829-985
                                       
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 7, 2006
                                            
BEFORE:  ROTH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, and
BUCKWALTER, District Judge*
(Filed: April 6, 2006)
                                               
*Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for     
  the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
                                  
OPINION
                                  
2BUCKWALTER, Senior District Judge.
Petitioner Noke Jantje Timbuleng (Timbuleng) seeks to reopen immigration
proceedings on account of new evidence regarding the conditions for Christians in
Indonesia and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  An Immigration Judge (IJ)
denied Timbuleng’s motion because: (1) the “evidence sought to be offered was available
and could have previously been presented,” and (2) Timbuleng failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), which are
necessary to raise on ineffective representation claim.  (App. 237.)  The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.  The BIA found that Timbuleng substantially
complied with Lozada’s requirements, but failed to “demonstrate[] prejudice flowing
from his former attorney’s allegedly ineffective representation, [because] his motion
fail[ed] to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.”  (App. 2.)  We conclude
that the BIA’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and that its
conclusion to deny Timbuleng’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. 
Therefore, the BIA’s decision will be affirmed.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Timbuleng is a citizen of Indonesia who was admitted into the United States
on March 17, 2001 as a non-immigrant visitor for business with authorization to remain
in the United States until April 15, 2001.  On April 9, 2003, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging Timbuleng with
       Timbuleng’s asylum application was “incorrectly filed because the IJ, rather than the1
DHS, had exclusive jurisdiction over the asylum application once [Timbuleng] was
placed in removal proceedings.”  (App. 236 n.2.)
       In addition to being incomplete, Timbuleng’s asylum application was untimely2
because it was filed more than one year after his arrival in the United States.  (App. 236
n.2) 
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being removable as an alien who remained in the United States for a time longer than
permitted after admission as a non-immigrant.  On April 23, 2003, Timbuleng incorrectly
submitted an asylum application to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) instead
of submitting the application to an Immigration Judge (IJ).   The DHS rejected and1
returned Timbuleng’s asylum application because it was incomplete.2
On May 15, 2003, Timbuleng, represented by his former counsel, appeared
before an IJ.  Timbuleng admitted to the factual allegations contained in the NTA and that
he was deportable as charged.  In lieu of removal, Timbuleng requested asylum,
withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and voluntary
departure.   The IJ reminded Timbuleng that his asylum application had been rejected and
returned as incomplete, and gave him until June 12, 2003 to submit a completed
application to the immigration court.  Timbuleng never submitted a completed asylum
application.
On October 6, 2003, the IJ found Timbuleng removable as charged and
granted his request for voluntary departure.  At that time, Timbuleng withdrew his
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
4Against Torture, and waived his right to appeal.
On October 31, 2003, through new counsel, Timbuleng filed a motion to
reconsider the October 6, 2003 decision “in light of the violent conditions that exist in
Indonesia and [Timbuleng’s] specific fears” of returning to Indonesia.  (App. 245.)  In
support of his motion, Timbuleng submitted new evidence, including personal statements
explaining his experiences in Indonesia and a collection of news reports detailing the
violence and turmoil there. 
On January 2, 2004, the IJ denied Timbuleng’s motion, treating it as both a
motion to reconsider and a motion to reopen.  The request for reconsideration was denied
because Timbuleng “failed to identify any specific factual or legal error in the prior
decision.”  (App. 237.)  The request to reopen was denied “because the evidence sought
to be offered was available and could have previously been presented.”  Id.  In addition,
the IJ found that Timbuleng did not allege or establish changed country conditions in
Indonesia.  Finally, the IJ found that Timbuleng failed to properly raise an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under Matter of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).  
Timbuleng appealed the IJ’s January 2, 2004 decision to the BIA.  On
September 12, 2004, the BIA affirmed without opinion the IJ’s denial of Timbuleng’s
motion to reconsider and reopen. Timbuleng did not seek review of the BIA’s decision.
On October 12, 2004, Timbuleng filed a motion to reopen and a motion for
a stay of removal with the BIA.  In support of his motion, Timbuleng submitted an
      The internet articles submitted to the BIA in support of Timbuleng’s motion to3
reopen were different than those previously submitted to the IJ in support of his motion
for reconsideration.
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affidavit and several internet articles describing the conditions in Indonesia.   In his3
affidavit, Timbuleng for the first time stated that Christian services met in his home and
that as a result, Muslims entered his home, slapped him on the face, told him to stop the
services, and “broke glass in [his and his guests’] cars.”  (App. 17-18.)  According to
Timbuleng, similar incidents occurred on about six different occasions.  (App. 18.)
On March 31, 2005, the BIA denied Timbuleng’s motion to reopen,
resulting in the present appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), the Attorney General may grant asylum to an
alien who is a “refugee” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  An applicant
must show that he or she
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of [the country of such
person’s nationality or in which such a person last habitually
resided], because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or politician opinion .
. . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  In the present case, the BIA found that Timbuleng failed to
establish a prima facie case for asylum because the evidence submitted does not
“establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, or that the respondent
       In his brief to this Court, Timbuleng also presented the following issue for review4
concerning the untimeliness of his asylum application: “Although the Immigration Court
found that petitioner sat on his right the BIA made no mention of it and therefore should
not [sic] this issue be resolved in petitioner’s favor.”  (Petit. Br. at 2.)  Timbuleng did not,
however, include this issue in the argument portion of his brief.  It is not necessary for us,
as it was not necessary for the BIA, to address whether Timbuleng’s asylum application
was timely because we find that Timbuleng is not eligible for asylum. 
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more likely than not will be persecuted or tortured if removed to Indonesia.”  (App. 2.) 
The BIA reasoned that “the incidents of harm are too random and sporadic to show either
a reasonable possibility or a clear probability that respondent will be harmed in a manner
that rises to the level of persecution or torture.”  Id.
When a motion to reopen is denied for failure to establish a prima facie
case, the BIA’s findings of fact should be reviewed for substantial evidence and the
ultimate decision to deny the motion should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.   Sevoian
v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2002).  Timbuleng argues that the BIA abused its
discretion in two ways.  First, Timbuleng claims that the BIA erred in applying the “more
likely than not” standard of proof instead of the more generous “well-founded fear”
standard.  Timbuleng points out that the well-founded fear standard requires a finding of
“reasonable possibility” and not reasonable “probability.”  Second, Timbuleng argues that
his “affidavit alone establishes past persecution” and that he has a well-founded fear of
returning to Indonesia based on his past experiences.   (Petit. Br. at 6.)4
Timbuleng’s first argument fails because the BIA clearly stated in its
opinion that the “incidents of harm are too random and sporadic to show either a
7reasonable possibility or a clear probability that [Timbuleng] will be harmed in a manner
that rises to the level of persecution or torture.”  (App. 2) (emphasis added).  Therefore,
the BIA did apply the proper “reasonable possibility” standard advocated by Timbuleng.
Timbuleng’s second argument fails because he has not established past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.  With regard to past persecution,
Timbuleng claims that Muslims threw stones at his house, told him to stop holding
religious services, slapped him on the face, and “broke glass in [his and his guests’] cars.” 
(App. 18.)  Persecution is defined as “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic
restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12
F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  This Court has recognized that “[r]andom, isolated
criminal acts perpetrated by anonymous thieves do not establish persecution.”  Lie v.
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172,
1177 (9th Cir. 2004)).   In Lie, the Court held that the petitioner’s “account of two
isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by unknown assailants, which resulted only in the theft
of some personal property and a minor injury, [were] not sufficiently severe to be
considered persecution.”  Lie, 396 F.3d at 536.  Like the facts of Lie, Timbuleng has
alleged isolated criminal acts which, even if motivated by religion, are not sufficiently
severe to be considered persecution.  Therefore, the BIA did not err in holding that the
incidents alleged by Timbuleng do not rise to the level of past persecution. 
To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, a petitioner must
8demonstrate: (1) a subjective fear of persecution through credible testimony, and (2) “ a
pattern or practice . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situation to the
applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . .”  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A).  In the present case, the
BIA focused on the second-prong of the well-founded fear test to find that the evidence
submitted by Timbuleng does not reflect a pattern or practice of persecution. 
“[T]o constitute a ‘pattern or practice,’ the persecution of the group must be
‘systemic, pervasive, or organized.’”  Lie, 396 F.3d at 537 (quoting Ngure v. Ashcroft,
367 F.3d 975, 991 (8th Cir. 2004)).  “[V]iolence or other harm perpetrated by civilians . .
. does not constitute persecution unless such acts are ‘committed by the government or
forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.’”  Lie, 296 F.3d at 537
(quoting Abddulrahman v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
In the present case, the BIA found that the alleged harm was “too random
and sporadic to . . . rise[] to the level of persecution or torture.”  (App. 2.)  In Lie, this
Court, specifically considering whether the recent violence by Muslim extremists against
Christians in Indonesia constituted a pattern or practice of persecution, held that this
violence “has been primarily wrought by fellow citizens and not the result of
governmental action or acquiescence” and therefore is not a pattern or practice of
persecution.  Lie, 396 F.3d at 537.  Timbuleng has not demonstrated that the
circumstances in Indonesia have changed since the decision in Lie to include government
9action or acquiescence.  Therefore, the BIA did not err in finding that there is not a
pattern or practice of persecution of Christians in Indonesia at this time.
We will deny the petition for review.
